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I. INTRODUCTION
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005 (BAPCPA)1 implemented the most substantial revision to American
bankruptcy law in nearly three decades.2 The BAPCPA’s main effect is
* The Author, an associate in the New York office of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
LLP, received his J.D from the University of San Diego in 2006 where he graduated cum
laude and was appointed to the Order of the Coif. Prior to attending the University of
San Diego School of Law, the Author received a B.S. in Business Administration from
Fordham University in 2003.
I would like to thank Professor Mary Jo Wiggins for her patience and valuable suggestions.
I would also like to thank Hope Garcia for the immeasurable support she provided to me
throughout all of law school.
1. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified at 11 U.S.C.).
2. Prior to the BAPCPA, the Bankruptcy Code had not seen a major revision
since the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C.). See Rodney Tanaka, New Bankruptcy Laws Aren’t That Bad,
INLAND VALLEY DAILY BULL., Jan. 4, 2006 (noting that the BAPCPA is the most drastic
revision of American bankruptcy law since the late 1800s), available at http://blog.
startfreshtoday.com/archives/162-print.html.
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to improve the position of creditors, both secured and unsecured, and
impose greater personal accountability on individuals who file for
bankruptcy—debtors.3 Although the name “Consumer Protection Act”
suggests a law whose goal is to foster humanitarian treatment of debtors
and further rehabilitation, commentators generally view the BAPCPA as
anything but pro-debtor.4 Many have referred to the BAPCPA as the
best bankruptcy act money can buy.5 If the slant of the BAPCPA is
indeed the result of effective lobbying, it was the lobbying power of
creditors, not debtors, that influenced Congress.6
Bankruptcy law is wrought with compelling policy tensions, which
legislators, judges, and academics must constantly balance. Bankruptcy
law seeks to foster a “fresh start” and promote the rehabilitation of
distressed debtors discharged from bankruptcy,7 while simultaneously
3. While the term debtors ordinarily refers to any person or entity liable to
another person or entity, this Note will use the term to refer specifically to individuals or
entities that file for bankruptcy relief.
4. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Rash and Ride-Through Redux: The Terms for
Holding on to Cars, Homes and Other Collateral Under the 2005 Act, 13 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 457, 457 n.3 (2005) (noting that some academics refuse to refer to the
BAPCPA by using its proper name because of the Act’s “dubious policy choices”);
Robert J. Keach, Dead Man Filing Redux: Is the New Individual Chapter Eleven
Unconstitutional?, AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV., 483, 500-02 (2005) (discussing whether
amendments to Chapter 11 go so far as to constitute involuntary servitude in violation of
the Thirteenth Amendment).
5. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 4, at 457 (discussing “what can go wrong when
an interest group uses its muscle to pass a complex piece of legislation”).
6. It is unlikely that debtors would be able to fund significant lobbying efforts for
a number of reasons. First, individuals who enter bankruptcy do not have the type of
disposable income necessary to contribute to political causes. Second, debtors typically
interact less frequently with the bankruptcy system than do creditors. Debtors are
prohibited from frequently filing for bankruptcy, thus they have minimal incentives to
expend resources in attempts to modify bankruptcy laws. Conversely, certain creditors,
including those whose businesses revolve around extending credit to consumers,
routinely interact with the bankruptcy systems. Because certain creditors routinely
participate in bankruptcy proceedings, it is in their best interest to expend resources in
efforts to reform the bankruptcy laws. Thus, it is not surprising that creditors exert more
influence over Congress than debtors.
7. The fresh start policy allows the debtor to retain certain personal and real
property after discharge from bankruptcy:
A fundamental component of an individual debtor’s fresh start in bankruptcy is
the debtor’s ability to set aside certain property as exempt from the claims of
creditors. Exemption of property, together with the discharge of claims, lets
the debtor maintain an appropriate standard of living as he or she goes forward
after the bankruptcy case.
4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 522.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th
ed. rev. 2006) [hereinafter COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY]. Rehabilitation facilitates the
humanitarian goals of bankruptcy laws:
The goal of debtor rehabilitation is, according to one commentary, accomplished in
at least three ways. First, a collective process reduces costs associated with
monitoring the debtor to protect the creditor from the race to the courthouse
that occurs outside the bankruptcy process. Second, the interested parties are
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ensuring that creditors receive repayment of debts owed to them by
debtors.8 When bankruptcy law focuses too heavily on paternalistic goals—
providing a fresh start to debtors and fostering debtor rehabilitation—
both creditors and consumers suffer financially.9 Every dollar that remains
with the debtor in furtherance of a fresh start is a dollar removed from
the bankruptcy estate, and thus, a dollar that cannot go to repayment of
debt.10 This Note addresses this central policy tension as it relates to the
revised homestead exemption under the BAPCPA.
Part II of this Note introduces the reader to the basics of exemption
law and some of the major changes implemented by the BAPCPA. Of
particular importance in Part II is the creation of a $125,000 cap on all
interest acquired by the debtor in her homestead within the 1215 days
preceding filing for bankruptcy.11 Part III then describes In re Blair,12 a
case which considered whether equity acquired by way of appreciation
or mortgage payments within the 1215-day period is subject to the
benefited by the administrative efficiencies of a collective proceeding. Third,
a collective proceeding is likely to increase the aggregate pool of assets by
prohibiting a disadvantageous, piecemeal liquidation of the debtor's assets.
9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 2 (1999) (citing Bankruptcy for Nonbankruptcy Purposes:
Are There Any Limits?, 6 REV. LITIG. 95 (1987)).
8. The reader should not lose sight of the fact that bankruptcy law is not designed
as a means to allow debtors to shirk their responsibilities. Instead, bankruptcy law seeks
to foster the proper balance between humane treatment of the debtor and adequate
repayment of debts owed:
In terms of societal function, the law of bankruptcy embodies two competing
policy considerations: providing a fresh start to debtors and protecting the
rights of creditors. The fresh start policy is designed both to relieve the honest
debtor of the burden of repaying insurmountable debts and to provide him with
enough assets to resume a productive life as a responsible, contributing, debtpaying member of society. Bankruptcy also seeks to protect creditors by arranging
the orderly repayment of debts. The Bankruptcy Code provides for creditor
protection by gathering all of the debtor's property and placing it into a central
estate, automatically staying all collection efforts to prevent aggressive creditors
from devouring the estate, and providing an opportunity for all creditors to be
treated fairly and have their claims repaid in an organized, predictable manner.
Ryan J. Donohue, Thou Shalt Not Reorganize: Sacraments for Sale, First Amendment
Prohibitions and Other Complications of Chapter 11 Reorganization for Religious Institutions,
22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 293, 302 (2005) (citations omitted).
9. For example, if the bankruptcy laws prohibited recovery of more than fifty
percent by any credit card company, two arguably negative results would follow: credit
card companies would be less willing to extend credit and credit card companies would
likely increase the rates they charge cardholders and merchants.
10. The bankruptcy estate is essentially the pool of assets used to pay creditors.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 522(p) (2000 & West. Supp. 2005).
12. 334 B.R. 374 (N.D. Tex. 2005).
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aforementioned cap.13 The Blair court held that the cap on homestead
exemptions does not apply to debtors who acquire title more than 1215
days before filing a bankruptcy petition, regardless of whether the
debtors acquire equity during the 1215-day period.14 Finally, Part IV
proposes an alternative interpretation of the revised homestead cap. This
proposal, unlike the conclusion reached by the Blair court, is consistent
with the goals of the BAPCPA because it increases the size of many
bankruptcy estates and promotes fairness to creditors.15
II. THE BAPCPA
President George W. Bush signed the BAPCPA into law on April 20,
2005.16 While the majority of the provisions did not become effective
until October 17, 2005, certain provisions, including the cap on homestead
exemptions, became effective immediately.17 The BAPCPA’s major
provisions benefit creditors at the expense of debtors.18 Congress made
a clear policy choice when drafting the BAPCPA: bankruptcy law had
become too paternalistic and needed substantial pro-creditor revision.19
Congress sought to prevent abuse of the bankruptcy system, discouraging
consumers from filing bankruptcy and encouraging those debtors who
do file bankruptcy petitions into repayment plans under Chapter 13.
The revisions to § 707(b) of the Code exemplify the pro-creditor
revisions under the BAPCPA.20 Under § 707(b), a debtor’s case will be
dismissed from Chapter 7 or converted to Chapter 13 upon a finding that
the debtor has abused the bankruptcy system.21 Abuse occurs when the
13. See id. at 375.
14. See id. at 376-77.
15. The size of a bankruptcy estate can be measured by subtracting the debtor’s
exemptions from the debtor’s assets. The proposed rule will increase the size of many
bankruptcy estates by reducing the size of debtor’s exemptions. Part IV, infra, provides
a number of examples which illustrate this principle. Larger bankruptcy estates benefit
creditors because they increase the amount which creditors will recover.
16. WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN & LAWRENCE R. AHERN III, 2005 BANKRUPTCY
REFORM LEGISLATION WITH ANALYSIS 11 (2005).
17. Id. (“Although several specific provisions of BAPCPA are effective immediately
upon enactment or at other times specified, the bulk of BAPCPA amendments and
additions to the former Code are effective in cases filed 180 days after enactment. The 180
days from the President’s signing would be October 17, 2005.”).
18. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000 & West. Supp. 2005) (imposing numerous
additional limitations on the protection afforded debtors through the automatic stay); §
521(a)(6) (removing the protection of the automatic stay when the debtor fails to take
certain actions); § 707(b) (creating the “means test” for Chapter 7 eligibility); § 1322(d)
(extending the length of typical Chapter 13 plans to five years).
19. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31 at 3-5 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88,
89-92.
20. § 707(b).
21. Id.
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debtor either (a) fails the means test and fails to rebut the presumption of
bad faith; or (b) exhibits general grounds for bad faith.22 A consumer
debtor fails the means test if a court determines that the debtor has more
than $167 in monthly income under the provision’s long and complicated
formula.23 A debtor who fails the means test may only remain in Chapter 7
upon a rebuttal of the presumption of bad faith.24 In order to rebut the
presumption of bad faith, the debtor must attest to “special circumstances”
that adjust the debtor’s monthly income below the threshold amounts.25
Debtors typically prefer Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 because Chapter 7 provides
a quicker discharge of the debtor’s obligations.26 However, because many
debtors cannot prove special circumstances, the means test is likely to
reduce the number of debtors who qualify for Chapter 7 substantially.
The means test embodies the pro-creditor purpose of the BAPCPA.27
The most controversial exemption in the Bankruptcy Code prior to the
passage of the BAPCPA was the homestead exemption. A bankruptcy
estate commences when a debtor files for bankruptcy or when an involuntary
case is commenced against the debtor.28 The estate is “defined broadly

22. Id.
23. Id.; Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors:
Is the Means Test the Only Way?, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 665, 665 (2005) (noting
further that for some debtors the threshold income amount is as little as $100 of income
per month).
24. § 707(b).
25. There are a number of ways to establish special circumstances:
In any proceeding brought under this subsection, the presumption of abuse
may only be rebutted by demonstrating special circumstances, such as a
serious medical condition or a call or order to active duty in the Armed Forces,
to the extent such special circumstances that justify additional expenses or
adjustments of current monthly income for which there is no reasonable
alternative.
§ 707(b)(2)(B).
26. See 1 ROSEMARY E. WILLIAMS, BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE HANDBOOK § 5:99 (2d.
ed. 2005) (noting that the Chapter 7 debtor receives a discharge in significantly less time
than the Chapter 13 debtor).
27. The means test is advantageous to creditors because it removes certain debtors
from bankruptcy. When a debtor is removed from bankruptcy the debtor is obligated to
pay the entire amount owed to each creditor. Conversely, a debtor who remains in the
bankruptcy system may be discharged despite only repaying a small portion of what was
owed to creditors. A debtor removed from bankruptcy for failing the means test will
have to repay his or her debts in their entirety. Thus, the means test favors creditors by
forcing certain debtors to repay their entire debt, instead of a small portion of their debt.
28. See 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 1083 (1999).
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to include all legal and equitable interests of the debtor.”29 However, the
debtor may claim certain property as exempt from the bankruptcy
proceeding.30 Consistent with the fresh start policy behind the Code, the
debtor retains exempt property after discharge from bankruptcy.31 Prior
to the BAPCPA, a small number of states provided debtors with unlimited
homestead exemptions,32 which allowed debtors to protect their assets
from creditors prior to filing bankruptcy.33 Debtors could abuse an unlimited
homestead exemption by selling nonexempt assets and investing the
proceeds in a homestead.34 By engaging in pre-bankruptcy planning,
debtors were able to increase the portion of their assets which were
exempt from the bankruptcy estate. Some debtors went so far as to relocate
to states with unlimited homestead exemptions and acquire lavish homes

29. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 7, at Intro.01. The broad definition of
the bankruptcy estate brings in as many assets and interests as possible:
With certain limited exceptions, the initial pool of assets which forms the
estate created upon the commencement of a bankruptcy case consists of all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement
of the case, wherever located and by whomever held. The scope of the
bankruptcy estate formed upon the commencement of a bankruptcy case has
thus been described as sweeping, in that virtually all of the debtor's interests in
property existing as of case commencement are automatically included in the
estate.
9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 1084 (citations omitted).
30. See 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 1245.
31. Exempt property under the respective chapters of the Bankruptcy Code is
property which the debtor may retain after discharge from bankruptcy:
In cases under Chapter 7, exempt property is that property which the debtor
will retain and which cannot be seized by the trustee for sale and distribution to
creditors. . . . In cases under Chapter 11, the individual debtor may withhold
exempt property from disposition under a plan of arrangement with creditors.
See WILLIAMS, supra note 26, at § 4:6. The Code allows states to forbid their citizens
from using the federal exemptions listed in § 522. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2000 &
West. Supp. 2005). Thirty-four states, including New York and California, have opted
out of the federal exemptions scheme. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 7, at
¶ 522.01. In states that have not opted out of the federal scheme, debtors are free to elect
either the federal exemptions scheme or the state exemption scheme in the debtor’s state
of domicile. See § 522(b).
32. See Daniel Morman, Judgment Liens, Homestead Exemptions and Involuntary
Bankruptcies: Who Gets What After BAPCPA, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20, 20 (2005)
(“Many states provide for homestead exemptions to some degree. However, while
Florida garners all the fame and glory for its unlimited homestead, [sic] exemption, four
other states—Texas, Iowa, Kansas and South Dakota—have unlimited homestead
exemptions as well.”).
33. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31 at 15-16 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88,
101-02.
34. See id.
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in order to protect their assets from creditors.35 For this reason, many
termed the exemption the “mansion loophole.”36
The mansion loophole garnered substantial attention during the drafting
of the BAPCPA.37 Congress reformed the homestead exemption by adding
§ 522(p) to the Code in an effort to curb the bankruptcy system abuse
afforded by the mansion loophole.38 Section 522(p) prevents a debtor from
claiming as exempt “any amount of interest that was acquired by the
debtor during the 1215-day period preceding the date of the filing of the
petition that exceeds in the aggregate $125,000 in value in [real property
used as a residence or homestead].”39 Unfortunately, Congress did not define
“interest that was acquired” or sufficiently explain how the § 522(p) cap
should be applied. These drafting shortcomings lead to the controversy
presented in Blair.40
III. IN RE BLAIR
In May 2005, Kevin Edward Blair and Susan Robin Blair (the Blairs)
filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.41 The Blairs elected to
utilize Texas state exemptions instead of federal exemptions.42 Before
the BAPCPA, the Blairs would have been entitled to an unlimited
homestead exemption under the Texas exemption scheme.43 The Blairs

35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Margaret Howard, Exemptions Under the 2005 Bankruptcy Amendments:
A Tale of Opportunity Lost, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 402 (2005). The mansion loophole
drew unwelcome attention when it became public in July of 2002 that former WorldCom
CFO Scott D. Sullivan was building a $15 million mansion in Boca Raton Florida that
might qualify for the homestead exemption. Barry A. Nelson & Kevin E. Packman,
Florida’s Unlimited Homestead Exemption Does Have Some Limits, 78 FLA. B.J. 60, 60
(2003).
37. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31 at 15-16.
38. See id. (categorizing the amended homestead exemptions as a reform intended
to curb abuse of the bankruptcy system and noting that the bill sought to restrict the
mansion loophole).
39. 11 U.S.C. § 522(p) (2000 & West. Supp. 2005).
40. In re Blair, 334 B.R. 374, 375 (N.D. Tex. 2005).
41. Id.
42. Id. For a list of the federal exemptions, see § 522.
43. See Morman, supra note 32, at 20. Subsequent to passage of the BAPCPA,
courts disagree whether the § 522(p) cap applies to debtors who elect state exemption
schemes. Compare In re McNabb, 326 B.R. 785, 791 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005) (holding
that the § 522(p) cap is not applicable to debtors who reside in states that do not allow
debtors to chose between federal and state exemptions), with In re Kaplan, 331 B.R. 483,
488 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005) (relying on the silence of legislative history in holding that
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claimed a homestead exemption of $688,606, which represented the
entire equity interest in their home.44
Southwest Security Bank (SSB), an unsecured creditor, filed an
objection to the Blairs’ claimed homestead exemption.45 Citing § 522(p),
SSB objected to “any and all interest that the Debtors acquired between
January 27, 2002 (1215 days prior to the Petition Date) and the Petition
Date which exceeds $125,000. . . .”46 SSB’s objection presented a novel
question for the court: whether the $125,000 cap on homestead exemptions
applies to debtors who acquire title to real property outside the 1215-day
period but continue to accumulate equity during the period.47
The Blair court held that the 522(p) cap did not apply to the Blairs
because they acquired title to their home outside of the 1215-day
period.48 The court drew a puzzling distinction between equity and title.49
According to the Blair court’s reasoning, “one does not actually ‘acquire’
equity in a home. One acquires title to a home.”50 This distinction
directly contradicts the contemporary understanding of the term equity.
Equity is defined as, “[i]n the context of real estate, the difference
between the current market value of the property and the amount the
owner still owes on the mortgage. Thus, it is the amount, if any, the owner
would receive after selling a property and paying off the mortgage.”51
Equity in the real estate market is something homeowners acquire over
time.52
The Blair court premised its holding on a fatal misunderstanding of
the phrase “interest that was acquired” as used in the homestead
exemption cap. In holding that the 522(p) cap does not apply to debtors
who acquire title more than 1215 days prior to filing for bankruptcy, the
court incorrectly interpreted the phrase to refer to the acquisition of
title.53 Rather, “interest that was acquired” likely refers to the acquisition of
equity. It is hard to believe that Congress intended to provide that the
522(p) does not apply to equity acquired during the 1215 days before a
debtor files a bankruptcy petition, as the Blair court held. Such an
the § 522(p) cap is applicable to all debtors regardless of whether the debtors are allowed
to choose federal exemptions under state law).
44. Blair, 334 B.R. at 375.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 376-78.
49. See id. at 376.
50. Id.
51. INVESTOPEDIA FINANCIAL DICTIONARY, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/
equity.asp (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
52. A homeowner who holds title to her home but owes more than the current
market value has no equity.
53. See Blair, 334 B.R. at 376.
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interpretation of the homestead exemption cap is contrary to the procreditor purpose which defines the BAPCPA and the exemption itself.54
The Blair court bolstered its erroneous holding by noting that its
interpretation of the § 522(p) cap was “consistent with the companion
provision in § 522(p) added by the BAPCPA.”55 Section 522(p)(2)(B),
the companion provision to which the Blair court referred, provides an
exception to the $125,000 cap on interest acquired for any interest
transferred from a previous primary residence within the same state.
“[A]ny amount of such interest does not include any interest transferred
from a debtor’s previous principal residence (which was acquired prior
to the beginning of such 1215-day period) into the debtor’s current
principal residence, if the debtor’s previous and current residences are
located in the same State.”56
Contrary to the court’s assertion, this § 522(p)(2)(B) companion
provision does nothing to support the assumption that “interest” in
§ 522(p) refers to title rather than equity. In fact, the Blair court’s distinction
between title and equity is weakened by its own interpretation of the
companion provision. The court summarized the companion provision
as follows: “this subsection allows for rollover by debtors of the equity
in one home to another home located in the same state.”57 The Blair
court inexplicably interpreted interest to mean title in § 522(p)(1),58 while
interpreting it to mean equity in § 522(p)(2)(B).59
A consistent interpretation requires that the term interest refer to either
title or equity throughout § 522(p). Interpreting interest to refer to title
would make § 522(p)(2)(B) incomprehensible, since one cannot transfer
title from one home to another home. Thus, although interpreting interest to

54. The Purpose and Summary section of the legislative history outlines the policy
objectives Congress sought to achieve with the BAPCPA. The House Report lists the
goals of the BAPCPA as increasing personal financial accountability, preventing “the
proliferation of serial filings,” and implementation of a means test “which is intended to
ensure that debtors repay creditors the maximum they can afford.” H.R. REP. NO. 10931 at 2, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 89 (emphasis added). The legislative history
of the BAPCPA strongly suggests that the homestead exemption focuses on acquisition
of equity rather than acquisition of title. See id. (“[T]he bill caps the amount of
homestead equity a debtor may shield from creditors, under certain circumstances.”).
55. Blair, 334 B.R. at 377.
56. 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(2)(B) (2000 & West. Supp. 2005).
57. Blair, 334 B.R. at 377 (emphasis added). That the companion provision refers
to equity undermines the Blair court’s interpretation of “interest that was acquired.”
58. See id.
59. See id.
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refer to equity throughout § 522(p) would invalidate the Blair rule, it
would be consistent with the Blair court’s logical interpretation of
522(p)(2)(B).
The Blair court further attempted to strengthen its holding by citing a
number of recent bankruptcy cases, which are all in fact distinguishable
from the Blair decision.60 First, the Blair court quoted In re Virissimo,
where the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada said that “[t]he
monetary cap applies if the debtor acquired such property within the
1215-day period preceding the filing of the petition.”61 However, the
preceding quotation does not necessarily support the Blair court’s
distinction between title and equity. The Virissimo court’s statement
would hold true regardless of whether “interest” in § 522(p) referred to
title or equity. Furthermore, the quotation does not say—as the Blair
court contends—that the monetary cap only applies to homes acquired
within 1215 days prior to filing the bankruptcy petition.62
The strongest support for the Blair court’s decision comes from its
citation of Collier on Bankruptcy.63 Collier proposed that the homestead
exemption cap should not apply to any amount of interest which results
from appreciation or regularly scheduled mortgage payments.64 But
although Collier supports the Blair court’s holding that appreciation and
regular mortgage payments are not subject to the homestead exemption
cap, Collier does not support the court’s distinction between title and
equity. Instead, Collier understands the term interest within the meaning
of § 522(p) to refer to equity rather than title.65 Collier further implies
that the portion of debtor’s equity attributable to mortgage payments in
excess of those regularly scheduled should be subject to the homestead
exemption cap.66

60. See id. at 377.
61. Id. (citing In re Virissimo, 332 B.R. 201, 207 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2005)).
62. See id.
63. Id. (citing COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 7, at ¶ 522.13[2]).
64. According to the Collier proposal:
Under this view, section 522(p) should not apply to any amount of interest in
the debtor’s homestead that is acquired through no affirmative action of the
debtor, such as an appreciation in the homestead’s value resulting solely from
changes in the real estate market during the 1215-day period. Similarly, this
provision should not prevent the debtor from claiming as fully exempt any
increase in the debtor’s equity interest in a homestead attributable to the
application of regularly scheduled mortgage payments during the 1215-day
period.
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 7, at ¶ 522.13[2].
65. Id. (discussing which types of equity should not be subject to the homestead
exemption cap).
66. See id.
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Collier bases its proposal—that the homestead exemption cap should
not apply to interest resulting from appreciation or regularly scheduled
mortgage payments—on the assumption that the purpose of § 522(p) is
to prevent debtors from engaging in egregious pre-bankruptcy planning.67
Collier ignores the possibility that the homestead exemption cap is an
integral part of a larger congressional scheme intended to shift the
balance of power in bankruptcy proceedings in favor of creditors.68
Collier’s proposal frustrates the purpose of the BAPCPA because it fails
to increase the size of the bankruptcy estate and is therefore unfair to
creditors. Moreover, other sections of the Code address the problem of
abusive pre-bankruptcy planning.69 Section 522(p) need not serve as a
proxy for the anti-fraud provisions of the Code, as Collier suggests. A
proper reading of the homestead exemption cap should increase the size
of bankruptcy estates and thus foster fairness to creditors, consistent
with the purpose behind the BAPCPA.
An alternative interpretation to Collier’s and the Blair court’s
interpretations of the homestead exemption cap is presented below.
This alternative interpretation fosters fairness to creditors while allowing
debtors to leave bankruptcy with ample liquid assets. The proposal
permits debtors to leave bankruptcy with liquid assets in an attempt to
further the humanitarian goals of bankruptcy law. The below proposal is
more consistent with congressional intent than the Blair court’s
interpretation of the § 522(p) cap (the Blair rule) because it reflects
Congress’s intent to shift the balance of bankruptcy law in favor of creditors.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION: THE 522(P) EXEMPTION
SHOULD APPLY TO EQUITY ACQUIRED DURING
THE 1215-DAY PERIOD
Future bankruptcy courts should not follow the holding of In re Blair.
Instead, they should apply the § 522(p) cap to equity acquired by the
debtor during the 1215-day period. Thus, a debtor’s homestead
67. See id.
68. A purposivist reading of § 522(p) would suggest that the provision should be
read consistently with the crux of the BAPCPA. Thus, the homestead exemption cap
should be interpreted in a manner that prevents hyper-paternalistic treatment of debtors
and fosters fairness to creditors. For a discussion of the ongoing war between purposivism
and textualism, see Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (2006).
69. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000) (providing for dismissal of bad faith filings).
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exemption should equal the debtor’s equity interest in the homestead
1216 days before filing for bankruptcy plus up to $125,000 of equity
acquired during the 1215 days before filing. The below examples illustrate
the significant difference between this proposed rule and the Blair rule.
Assume debtor Alpha closed on the purchase of a principal residence
on day one. At closing, Alpha transferred $20,000 to sellers and assumed
liability for a $180,000 mortgage. Alpha continued to make regular mortgage
payments, but filed a bankruptcy petition on day 1216. As of day 1216,
Alpha had made forty mortgage payments totaling $250,000, of which
$150,000 was attributable to repayment of principal.70
Assuming for the moment that the home’s value remained constant
from day one to day 1216, the proposed rule and the Blair rule would
produce similar results. Under the Blair rule, Alpha would not be subject to
the § 522(p) cap. Thus, assuming the value of Alpha’s home remained
constant, Alpha would walk away from bankruptcy with an unreduced
$170,000 interest in his $200,000 home under the Blair rule.71
The proposed rule differs from the Blair rule in that the proposed rule
would result in larger bankruptcy estates in many bankruptcy proceedings.
A bankruptcy estate is the total pool of a debtor’s interests which are
available to repay the debtor’s debts.72 The size of a bankruptcy estate can
be calculated as follows: debtor’s total assets minus debtor’s exemptions.
There is a positive correlation between the size of the bankruptcy estate
and the amount creditors receive in bankruptcy. Increasing the size of
bankruptcy estates is socially desirable because it fosters fairness to
creditors. Increasing the amount of outstanding debt which is repaid to
creditors prevents creditors from spreading the loss resulting from
nonpayment by bankrupt debtors to other consumers. Thus, bankruptcy
policies that favor repayment of debts ensure that non-defaulting
consumers do not have to subsidize consumers who default on their
debts.
Calculating the size of a § 522(p) exemption under the proposed rule
is a two-step process. First, Alpha is entitled to an exemption for the
entire equity interest that he possessed 1216 days before filing a bankruptcy
petition. In this example, Alpha would have a $20,000 exemption,
representing his interest in the home before the 1215-day period
commenced. Second, Alpha is entitled to an exemption of up to
$125,000 for acquisition of principal within the 1215-day period. In this

70. Alpha’s payments exceed the value of the home because $100,000 of the
$250,000 in payments is attributable to repayment of interest.
71. $170,000 is Alpha’s equity interest in the home resulting from a $20,000 down
payment plus $150,000 in mortgage payments attributable to repayment of principal.
72. See supra note 29.
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example, Alpha made mortgage payments of $250,000 during the 1215day period. Alpha should be entitled to claim an exemption on $125,000
of the $150,000 that was attributable to repayment of principal. Thus,
Alpha’s total homestead exemption under the proposed rule is $145,000.
In the previous example the proposed rule and the Blair rule produce
comparable results. However, this is largely attributable to two unrealistic
assumptions: that the home did not appreciate and that Alpha paid off
nearly his entire mortgage prior to filing for bankruptcy. In a more realistic
example, the discrepancy between the Blair rule and the proposed rule is
likely to be far greater.73 In recent years, the real property market
enjoyed rapid appreciation.74 The following example illustrates that in a
hypothetical based on assumptions reflecting the upward trend in real
estate value in the past few years, significant differences between the
proposed rule and the Blair rule are likely to emerge.
Arguably, the greatest shortcoming of the Blair rule is that it fails to
account for the value of any appreciation in the debtor’s home. Assume
Beta purchased a home on the same terms as Alpha. Unlike Alpha, Beta
lived in a rapidly appreciating real estate market. Beta’s home appreciated
greatly between the closing date and the time Beta filed bankruptcy,
consistent with trends in the local real estate market. In just 1215 days,
Beta’s home increased in value from $200,000 to $500,000. The Blair
rule would yield the same result for Beta in this example as it did for
Alpha in the first example: the debtors would be entitled to exemptions
73. A more realistic example would include less repayment of Alpha’s mortgage
and some change in the value of Alpha’s home. If, for example, Alpha only repaid
$20,000 of his mortgage, the Blair rule and the proposed rule would result in substantially
different results even if we still assume a static market value for the home. Under the
proposed rule, Alpha would be entitled to an exemption totaling his equity interest in the
home 1216 days before filing for bankruptcy, plus the portion of his mortgage payments
attributable to repayment of principal. Assuming that one-half of Alpha’s mortgage goes
to repayment of principal, the proposed rule would provide Alpha with a $30,000
exemption. Thus, the likely result under the proposed rule would be the sale of Alpha’s
home. By contrast, under the Blair rule Alpha would be entitled to retain the home.
74. A recent article places the increase in real property values in the United States
at 29% for a three-year period. Jon E. Hilsenrath & Patrick Barta, Amid Low Rates,
Home Prices Rise Across the Global Village, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2005, at A1. Similar
increases are becoming commonplace around the globe:
Over the past three years, measures of housing values are up 48% in France,
63% in Spain and they've nearly doubled in South Africa, according to data
gathered from these markets from sources including the Bank for International
Settlements, Economy.com and The Wall Street Journal. In just the past year,
prices have risen 19% in Hong Kong and 48% in Bulgaria.
Id.
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for the entire value of their respective homesteads.75 The greatest differences
between the Blair rule and this Note’s proposed rule will occur when the
debtor makes significant repayment of principal or enjoys significant
appreciation during the 1215-day period. This Note proposes that Beta
is only entitled to a $145,000 homestead exemption.76 Allowing Beta to
retain her $500,000 homestead under the Blair rule defeats the central
purpose of the BAPCPA.77
A particularly egregious result could occur under the Blair rule if
Gamma purchased a home on the same terms as Alpha and Beta, but
signed an interest-only mortgage.78 Under the Blair rule, Gamma would
be entitled to an exemption for the entire value of Gamma’s homestead.
If Gamma experienced the same appreciation as Beta, Gamma would
walk out of bankruptcy with $320,000 in equity in his homestead despite
investing only $20,000.79 Allowing Gamma to benefit from this type of
windfall is contrary to the purpose of the BAPCPA, since one of the
goals of the BAPCPA is to “ensure that debtors repay creditors the
maximum they can afford.”80 A debtor with over $300,000 in equity can
surely afford to contribute some of her equity to the bankruptcy estate
for the benefit of creditors. Under the proposed rule, Gamma would
only be entitled to a $145,000 exemption. This exemption is the sum of
Gamma’s pre-1215-day period equity and the maximum of $125,000 in
interest acquired during the 1215-day period.81 In Gamma’s case, the
$125,000 is the product of appreciation and not mortgage payments.
75. See In re Blair, 334 B.R. 374, 376-77 (N.D. Tex. 2005).
76. The $145,000 exemption is the sum of Beta’s pre-1215-day period interest and
a maximum $125,000 interest acquired during the 1215-day period.
77. See supra note 54.
78. The result under the Blair rule is egregious because the rule does not allow
Gamma’s creditors to benefit from the rapid appreciation Gamma experienced. Under
the terms of an interest-only mortgage, the borrower is only required to pay interest. See
Interest-Only Mortgage Tutorial, http://www.mtgprofessor.com/Tutorials2/InterestOnly.
htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
79. This $320,000 in equity results from subtracting Gamma’s outstanding liability
from the market value of the home. Because Gamma purchased the home for $200,000
and made an initial down payment of $20,000, her liability on the home was $180,000.
Gamma’s equity interest in the home is thus: $500,000 - $180,000 = $320,000.
80. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31 at 2, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 89 (emphasis
added).
81. The proposed rule does not differentiate between Beta and Gamma—one makes
mortgage payments on principal due and the other merely benefits from appreciation—
because the proposed rule recognizes the importance of incentivizing home ownership.
Further, a rule which only allowed an exemption for the portion of a debtor’s equity
which resulted from mortgage payments would unfairly discriminate against debtors
with satisfied mortgages. If the rule only allowed a debtor an exemption for equity
acquired through making mortgage payments, a debtor with a satisfied mortgage would
have to sell her home and acquire another (more expensive) home to realize an
exemption on equity acquired during the 1215-day period.
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Assume the market value of debtor Gamma’s home is inflated as a
result of a housing bubble. Housing bubbles are characterized by a
“rapid expansion followed by a contraction.”82 Critics may argue that
application of the proposed rule during a housing bubble would frustrate
the fresh start and humanitarian policies behind the Code. For example,
if Gamma elected to retain her home she would owe the bankruptcy estate
$355,000.83 Gamma could be unfairly harmed were she to liquidate other
exempt assets, pay her debt to the bankruptcy estate, and retain her
home. If the value of Gamma’s home subsequently declined, the bankruptcy
system would have encouraged a financially distressed individual to
condense her holdings into a single asset. Prudent policy would encourage
debtors to diversify their holdings, rather than suggest that debtors
liquidate their assets and wager their entire financial well-being on the
value of a single asset.84
It is unlikely that a debtor in Gamma’s situation will have the financial
resources to pay the amount owed to the bankruptcy estate on her
principal residence.85 Under the proposed rule, debtors in Gamma’s situation
would be incentivized to sell their homes rather than liquidate other
exempt assets to retain their home. Instead of wagering their financial
well-being on their principal residences, debtors will exit bankruptcy
with liquid assets. A debtor who sells her home under the proposed rule
will retain the amount of her homestead exemption. Thus, debtors will
leave bankruptcy with up to $125,000 plus their equity interest on the
1216th day preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
Consumer advocates will surely challenge the prudence of encouraging
debtors to sell their homes. Dispossessing debtors of their homes is
admittedly a costly process. Scholars often note that consumers have
significant emotional ties to their home and community.86 Home ownership
82. INVESTOPEDIA FINANCIAL DICTIONARY, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/
bubble.asp (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
83. In the previous example Gamma owned a home valued at $500,000 and had a
$145,000 homestead exemption.
84. See INVESTOPEDIA FINANCIAL DICTIONARY, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/d/diversification.asp (“Diversification is possibly the greatest way to reduce risk.”)
(last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
85. Gamma owed $355,000 to the bankruptcy estate as a result of the $500,000
market value of the home and the $145,000 exemption.
86. See Megan J. Ballard, Legal Protection for Home Dwellers: Caulking the
Cracks to Preserve Occupancy, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 277, 307 (2006) (proposing a fourfactor test to measure a subsidized home dweller’s interest in remaining in their current
home: “the length of the tenant’s tenure in the dwelling at issue, the degree to which the
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further promotes stability and development of social ties with one’s
neighbors.87 Debtors will also bear significant transaction costs when
they sell their home, search for a new home, and relocate their families.
At least part of the transaction cost burden can be shifted from the
debtor to the bankruptcy estate as an administrative expense. 88
Administrative expenses are those expenses incurred by the debtor after
filing for bankruptcy which become the responsibility of the estate rather
than the debtor.89 As an administrative expense, the bankruptcy estate
will pay the shifted transaction costs.90 Expenses arising from the sale of
the debtor’s house will likely qualify for administrative expense status
because they arise from a transaction pursuant to the petition for
bankruptcy and benefit the estate.91 Other transaction expenses may also
qualify as administrative expenses. 92 Classifying certain transaction
costs as administrative expenses softens the hardships debtors face when
they are asked to sell their homes and contribute to the bankruptcy estate
any deficiency between the value of their home and their homestead
exemption. By shifting the obligation of funding certain transactional
expenses from the debtor to the estate, the Code fosters humanitarian
treatment of the debtor.93

tenant customized or improved his or her dwelling, the interests of children or other
dependents who reside in the dwelling, and the reasonableness of the conduct or
circumstances that put housing at risk”); see also O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897) (“A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own
for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be
torn away without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you
came by it.”).
87. See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 194849 (2005) (discussing the role of property in fostering normative communities).
88. Administrative expenses are a type of expense that “have priority in the
distribution of the assets of the estate.” COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 7, at
¶ 503.01.
89. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 45-46 (7th ed. 1999).
90. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 7, at ¶ 503.01.
91. See id. at ¶ 503.06[3][a].
92. The list of administrative expenses in § 503(b) is nonexclusive:
Section 503(b) states that the administrative expenses ‘include’ the nine listed
categories. Section 102(3) provides that the terms ‘include’ and ‘including’ are
not to be construed as limitations. The result is that the nine described categories
cannot be considered an exhaustive list of all of the types of claims that are
entitled to administrative priority treatment.
Id. at ¶ 503.05[1] (citations omitted).
93. This illustrates that the proposed rule does not intend to frustrate debtor
rehabilitation. Instead, the proposed rule embodies an attempt to balance the competing
policy tensions within bankruptcy law.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Blair court’s interpretation of the phrase “interest that was acquired”
is contrary to both the common understanding of the term equity and the
conclusion reached by a leading treatise in bankruptcy law.94 Acquisition of
interest refers to acquisition of equity rather than title. Any rule premised
on a fundamental misunderstanding of the terms used in statutory
language is inherently flawed.
This Note’s proposed rule represents an accurate interpretation of
§ 522(p) and fosters fairness to creditors while ensuring that debtors
retain sufficient liquid assets to begin life with a fresh start after discharge.
The homestead exemption cap should apply to all equity acquired within
the 1215 days preceding the filing of a bankruptcy petition. If courts do
not interpret the § 522(p) cap in a manner consistent with this Note’s
proposal, Congress should intervene and amend the homestead exemption
cap to clarify that the cap applies to all equity acquired within the 1215
days preceding the filing of a bankruptcy petition.
SHAUN MULREED

94.

See supra Part III.
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